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PERPETUITIES LEGISLATION:
HAIL, PENNSYLVANIA!
AND THREE CHEERS FOR VERMONT, WASHINGTON AND
KENTUCKY; TWO CHEERS FOR MASSACHUSETTS,
MAINE AND CONNECTICUT; ONE CHEER FOR
IDAHO; AND RESPECTFUL APPLAUSE
FOR THE NEW HAMPSHIRE COURT

W.

BARTON LEAO

t

This Article started out as an answer to Philip Mechem's "Further
Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation" attacking the
Pennsylvania Estates Act of 1947 and all the rest of the "new-fangled
legislation" on perpetuities, 1954-59.1 But since others have expressed
themselves in a somewhat similar vein it seems worthwhile to answer
them all, especially as the roster of the opposition is so impressive:
Professor Percy Bordwell, sometime of Iowa, Harvard and
Rutgers.
Professor Philip Mechem, sometime of Iowa, now of Pennsylvania.
Professor Lewis M. Simes, sometime of Michigan, now of the
Sixty-five Club at Hastings.
Professor Bertel M. Sparks, New York University.2
I include Simes in this list with some hesitation. Bordwell, Mechem
and Sparks seem irreconcilable; they were brought up on the Gospel
according to Gray3 and seem determined to die in the true faith,
t Story Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. A.B. 1921, LL.B. 1924, Harvard University.
1 107 U. PA. L. Ry. 965 (1959). The adjective "new-fangled" is Mechem's and
I am indebted to him for recalling it to me. I hadn't heard it since my grandmother
died at the age of 86 shortly before World War II; and grandmother used it only with
reference to extreme and distasteful changes in women's fashions, such as the elimination of the bustle or the introduction of colored nail varnish. Pre-Mechem I don't
recall it being used to enrich scholarly discussion.
21 here provide references to the anti-reformist publications: SIMas, PUBLIc
POLICY AND THY DEAD HAND 72 (1955) ; SImES & SmITH, FurtnR
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(2d ed. 1956); Bordwell, Perpetuities From the Point of View of the Draughtsman,

11 RuTGERs L. Rxv. 429 (1956); Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed?
The "Wait and See" Doctrine, 52 MicH. L. REv. 179 (1953); Sparks, A Decade of
Transition in Future Interests, 45 VA. L. REv. 493 (1959) ; Sparks, Future Interests,
in N.Y. UNIV. LAv SCHOOL, 1955 ANN. StnvEY Am. L. 517, 525-28 (1956) [hereinafter cited as ANN. SuRvEY Am. L.]; Sparks, Future Interests, 1954 ANN. SURVEY
Am. L. 655, 664-68 (1955). Having provided data as to the academic titles of my
learned friends I will omit titles from here on, and trust that no offense will be taken
where none intended. I also will not clutter up the footnotes by detailed page references except where it seems to me important.
SI yield to no one in admiration for the contribution of Gray in his own era,
just as I make obeisance to Coke's learning on Littleton's "Tenures" and to Fearne's
"Contingent Remainders" with its passionate defense of the purity of the Rule in
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fundamentalist to the end.4 But since Simes and I agree that the Rule
badly needs repair, it is my guess that I could amend some of the
statutes I have sponsored to meet his objections (though I do not think
them serious, as will appear) and that if he got down to drafting and
actively sponsoring a statute to meet his own objectives, I would conclude that it did about ninety per cent of the job.
There is a sad and humiliating aspect of this distinguished group
of professors: they are all my friends of many years standing, and the
degree of virulence of their attacks on my ideas 5 is in direct proportion
Shelley's Case in their eras. My co-author and I, he being Gray's grandson, have
paid our tribute in the dedication of LEAcE & TUDOR, THE RULE AGAINST PERI'ETUiTiEs

(1957):
TO JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY
GRANDFATHER OF ONE OF US
PROFESSIONAL FOREBEAR OF BOTH

WHO IN HIS JURIDICAL VALHALLA
MAY WELL REALIZE
THAT HIS "REMORSELESS" RULE
WAS MORE APPROPRIATE
TO HIS TIME THAN TO OURS
However, it must be remembered that Gray's treatise is an 1886 book which, in its
current 1942 edition by Roland Gray, has preserved the original text and all of Gray's
1886 ideas. The problems of that middle year of Grover Cleveland's first term have
little resemblance to our problems today. This does not mean that Gray's 1886 ideas
are necessarily wrong at this date, but it does mean that they are not necessarily
right in our present climate and that we are entitled to think for ourselves in the
light of conditions as they now exist.
4 There is a passage in the preface to Mechem's recently published Cases on Future
Interests which is open to the alternative interpretations that: (a) he wishes he were
not a fundamentalist but can't help it, or (b) he fears that his colleagues in the profession will not recognize his fundamentalism. To assure objectivity in this matter
I quote from a review by Professor Lowell Turrentine: "The editor [Mechem] says
in his preface that the volume will strike many readers as unorthodox, if not heretical.
I had no such reaction." 12 J. LEGAL ED. 459, 460 (1960). I concur with Turrentine.
Dismantle the stake in the market square and carry away the faggots. Let's not
burn Mechem-for heresy, that is.
5..
. and jibes at me personally. Most learned readers will not be interested
in this bandying about of personalities, but as justification for any gentle taunts I may
be tempted to fling, mostly in footnotes, I wish here to record how I have been gouged,
kicked, and clawed. Restrained comments appear in bracketed italics.
Sparks is quite gentle. To him I am a "wait-and-see enthusiast" [The footnote
to this quote embraces in the epithet that rabid mob of extremists, the seven Justices
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts] who "became enamored" of the
"curious aberration" of the Pennsylvania statute and who makes "unreasoned attacks
upon the Rule."
Mechem, after referring to Gray as that "distinguished writer" and to Simes and
Schuyler as his "learned brothers" [Who denies any of these? What wounds is that
other nanes were mentioned in the article without accolade], calls me "the great protagonist of wait-and-see" [Is "great" an obeisance? I doubt it] who uses "intemperate
language" [The language in question appeared in that archtype of yellow journalism,
the Law Quarterly Review] "to popularize a few freak cases by giving them cute
names" [Wrong-I sought to depopularize widely destructive decisions by giving them
accurately descriptive ntames]. He also lets the reader in on my instability of personality by saying I become "infuriated" to the point of becoming an "enthusiast" for
reform. [He has me there, for I have said, right in print, "there is one tempermental
requirement for useful consideration of this subject: a capacity for constructive indignation. If we have lost it, we must recapture it." LEAcH & TUDOR, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 175; Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror,
65 HARv. L. REv. 721, 727 (1952).]
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to how well they know me and how closely we have been professionally
associated. On the other hand, most of the supporters of my published
views are men whom I know only casually if at all. I hesitate to draw
any general conclusion as to the charm and persuasiveness of my
physical presence or to adopt the recommendation of a colleague that
hereafter in appellate cases I eschew oral argument and submit on briefs.
To avoid the impression that this is a lone battle by an aging
Harvard law professor against the above-mentioned imposing list, I
should note that my views are shared by my American co-author, Owen
Tudor, my British co-author, Dr. J. H. C. Morris, the twelve members
of the British Law Reform Committee (of which more later), the fortyfour lawyers and judges who sponsored the Pennsylvania statute, the
law-trained members of the legislatures named in the subtitle of this
Article, and a fair spread of legal periodical literature.6
THE STATUTES AND THEIR BACKGROUNDS
Briefly summarized, my opinion is that the law of perpetuities is
presently defective in (a) imposing a requirement of prospective certainty of vesting, viewed from the date of creation of the interest, and
From the normally benign, kindly, even cherubic Bordwell comes the following:
"My good friend, Bart Leach [Et tu, Perci!] . . . is a power to be reckoned with.
. . . Moreover, he is a man of action [So this is indictable in New Jersey?], somewhat of a legal Billy Graham, who is not content until he has converted others to his
views and seen the law changed in accordance with his ideas." [Note the none too
subtle overtones of evangelistic fervor and precipitate revolutionary change-elements
likely to repel the New Jersey bar and legislature at which Bordwell's article is plainly
aimed.] "It is plain that he was the force behind the Massachusetts statute effective
January 1, 1955, which went as far in carrying out his ideas as he thought practicable."
[This suggestion of a Svengali-Trilby relationship between tue and the legislatures
which have passed these statutes would be a little hard to explain with reference to
the twelve lawyers, judges, and professors of the Lord Chancellor's Law Reform
Committee which, after two years' study, adopted nearly all my recommendationsbut probably Bordwell's failure to refer to the Committee Report and undertake the
explanation is a matter of dates. The Report doubtless was not available to him
before his article went to press, but he might try the explanation now.]
One can learn to enjoy anything, including being a pincushion for the barbs of
one's friends; so I here record that in my own university I have been dubbed The Don
Quixote of the Inconsequential Cause-but in another connection. See 46 A.B.A.J.
245 (1960).
6 See LEACHr & TUDOR, op. cit. supra note 3, apps. 1-5 & passim; MoRRis & LEACH,
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 33 passimn (1956) ; Law Reform Committee, Fourth
Report, CMD. No. 18 (1956) ; PA. CoMm. ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES LAWS, PROPOSED ESTATES ACT OF 1947 (1946) ; Brigy, A Defense of Pennsylvania'sStatute on Perpetuities,
23 TEmP. L.Q. 313 (1949) ; Cohan, The Pennsylvania Wait-and-See Perpetuity Doctrine-New Kernels fron Old Nutshells, 28 TEmP. L.Q. 321 (1955) ; Thornely,
Property Laz--The Rule against Perpetuities-Reform, 1957 CAMBRIGE L.J. 30;
Waterbury, Some Further Thoughts on Perpetuities Reform, 42 MINN. L. REv. 41
(1957). And the real pioneer in whose steps I am proud to follow is Quarles, The
Cy Pres Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule against Perpetuities
and Trusts for Accumulation, 21 N.Y.U.L. REv. 384 (1946). I do not mean to suggest
that all of these accept all of my views, nor indeed that all whom I count as opponents are 100% against me. Quite a wide spectrum is available for shadings of
opinion.
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(b) totally destroying a gift that offends the Rule instead of cutting it
down to size. Thus, I recommend legislation that (a) requires a court
to wait and see how events turn out and thus decide perpetuities cases
on facts that actually happen instead of facts that might have happened,
and (b) when a violation of the Rule is found, reform the interest on
the cy pres principle.
All of the statutes here considered carry out one or both of these
recommendations to a greater or lesser extent.'
Vermont: Full Scale Wait-and-See and Cy Pres
"Any interest in real or personal property which would violate
the rule against perpetuities shall be reformed, within the limits of
that rule, to approximate most closely the intention of the creator
of the interest. In determining whether an interest would violate
said rule and in reforming an interest the period of perpetuities shall
be measured by actual rather than possible events."
It is my belief that this simple statute does the whole necessary job and
will practically eliminate perpetuities litigation without opening the door
to perpetual family trusts.'
Washington and Kentucky
Washington copied the Vermont statute in 1959, making it applicable to trusts only; but this covers nearly all of the family-disposition
cases. Kentucky also copied it in 1960, without limitation to trusts,
but adding a clause that the measuring lives must have "a causal relationship to the vesting or failure of the interest."
Pennsylvania:Full Scale Wait-and-See
"Sec. 4. (a) General. No interest shall be void as a perpetuity
except as herein provided.
(b) Void Interest. Upon the expiration of the maximum
period allowed by the common-law rule against per7 CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§45-95 to -100 (1958); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-111
(1957) ; Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 381.215-.223 (1960); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 160, §§ 27-33
(Supp. 1959); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184a, §§ 1-6 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,

§§ 301.4, 301.5 (1950); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 501-03 (1959); Wash. Laws 1959,

ch. 46, §§ 1-6. After this Article was in proof, Maryland joined the parade with a
Massachusetts-type statute. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 197A (1957).
8 The Vermont legislature asked for my recommendations and a draft statute.
It is the only instance in which I have had a free hand. A summary of my testimony
in support of this act, developed in collaboration with the Harvard Law School Student Legislative Research Bureau, appears in LEACH & TUDOR, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 224. The five appendices to this volume all deal with various aspects of the perpetuities legislation covered by the present article.
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petuities as measured by actual rather than possible
events, any interest not then vested and any interest
in members of a class the membership of which is
then subject to increase shall be void.
Disposition When Invalidity Occurs..
Other Void Interests. All other void interests shall
vest in the person or persons entitled to the income at
the expiration of the period described in subsection

(b).

This was the first of the current crop of curative statutes. I had
nothing to do with it, but applaud it. It is the particular subject of
Mechem's attack; 9 Bordwell and Sparks have tended to train their
fire on the later statutes which I sponsored. The Pennsylvania statute
emerged from the Committee on Decedents' Estate Laws of the Joint
State Government Commission in a report dated November 15, 1946.
The Committee consisted of nine judges and twenty-two lawyers distributed geographically throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
and chosen for their experience in Orphans' Court matters and the list
included part-time teachers from Pittsburgh and Dickinson Law
Schools. The report was printed as a pamphlet and circulated to local
bar associations and to judges. It was also reprinted by the publisher
of one of the advance reports and circulated to its subscribers. Suggestions were received and changes made. Then, several months after
circulation to the profession, it was presented to the legislature.' 0 I do
9One of the real puzzles in this situation is why Mechem chooses me to clobber
about the Pennsylvania statute. I didn't draft it. Mechem's colleague Philip A.
Br~gy did. You might think that the reason Mechem goes after me and leaves Br~gy
alone is that Brigy has been less firm in advocacy or more respectful toward the
traditional lore of the Rule. Not so. Consider the following colorful passage which,
unaccountably, does not excite Mechem to literary mayhem: "As a result of this
hocus-pocus [the doctrine that a court must shut its eyes to events which have actually
occurred], the rule against perpetuities had degenerated into a sort of Sunday Supplement puzzle, providing laughs for law students but scarcely a logical and effective
limitation on the fettering of property. Furthermore, the result at common law of a
decision that a future interest was void because it might have done something which it
didn't, was no laughing matter for anyone. The void interest would be awarded back
to heirs or residuary beneficiaries long since dead and carried by the wills of unwitting
testators until it dropped, depleted by taxes paid along the way, into the laps of surprised persons who often had nothing to do with the original family or the original
gift. Thus were the sins of the father visited on the sons even to the third generationpresumably on the theory that the soul of the testator or settlor who caused all this
trouble would be taught a lesson. There were those who considered this whole procedure a little unworthy of the adult mind." Brgy, supra note 6, at 314. And Mechem
accuses me of intemperate language l
10 Letter of August 19, 1959, Philip A. Brigy to author. Mr. Br~gy had a major
part in drafting the act, was granted a fellowship at the University of Pennsylvania
to work on the various 1947 statutes, and has published a book on this legislation.
His discussion of perpetuities appears in BREGY, INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES
ACTS OF 1947, at 5251-5550 (1949).
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not suggest that the soundness of the statute is res judicata as far as
Mechem is concerned, especially since he is a relatively new boy in the
Commonwealth; but there appears to be nothing to the notion that this
was hasty, ill-considered legislation of which the nature was not understood. The Comments in the Committee Report are perfectly clear as
to what the statute was doing and why.1
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts: Life-Estate Wait-and-See,
Age-Contingency Cy Pres
These statutes, of which Massachusetts produced the first, cause
the wait-and-see doctrine to be applied only following life estates (or
contingencies based on lives) of persons in being when the period of
perpetuities starts to run. Thus the court waits until the end of the life
estate and looks at the facts as of that time. This will cover most
cases, but it clearly leaves some gaps which the Vermont and Pennsylvania statutes would fill. Another section provides that age contingencies in excess of twenty-one which would ,render a gift void will
be reduced to twenty-one-a limited cy pres application adapted from
the 1925 English Law of Property Act. This statute was originally
drafted by Professor A. James Casner, Mr. Guy Newhall (the dean of
the probate bar in Massachusetts), and myself. It was submitted for
comment to the Magsachusetts bar through the Bar Journal, to the
Abstract Club (an active conveyancing group), to the estates partners
of leading offices throughout the state, and informally to the Justices
of the Supreme Judicial Court. After two stages of amendment and
re-submission it was presented to the legislature and enacted. For the
purpose of providing a "legislative history" to aid in interpretation a
summary of the testimony before the Legal Affairs Committee was published in the Bar -Journaland the Harvard Law Review. 2 The Connecticut and Maine legislatures copied the statute verbatim.
Idaho
Idaho probably has full scale cy pres, applicable to trusts only. One
must say "probably" because the 1957 Idaho statute will certainly require interpretation. The Idaho legislature would be well advised to
substitute promptly either the Vermont or the Kentucky statute.
11 PA. Comm. ON DECEDENTS' ESTATE LAWs, PROPOSED ESTATES ACT

(1946).
at 321.

OF 1947
The act is defended in Br~gy, supra note 6, at 313, and in Cohan, supra note 6,

12 See LEACH & TUDOR, op. cit. supra note 3, at 197; Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HAv. L. REv. 1349 (1954).
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New Hampshire
The New Hampshire court has two decisions on the books which
lead to the logical conclusion that the state has judicially adopted both
cy pres and wait-and-see principles.'8 The first of these, reducing a
remote age contingency (reaching forty) to twenty-one, was castigated
by Gray in terms which now make strange reading in view of the
almost unanimous current agreement that a statute to the same effect is
4

desirable.1
Is

THERE ANY NEED FOR CORRECTIVE LEGISLATION?

I should have thought it unnecessary at this late date to discuss

this question.' 5 But no, Sparks declares that the common-law Rule
"has usually worked rather well" and that cases in which the conclusive
presumption of fertility has been applied where future issue was unlikely
"are extremely rare." Mechem feels that I used "some rather intemperate language" in my five-count indictment of the Rule in a pair of
1952 articles, suggests that if I could prove that "any very great number of wills have currently been the innocent victims of the Rule" I
I3 Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953); Edgerly
v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 Atl. 900 (1891).
14 See GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 857-93 (4th ed. 1942). The grounds
of Gray's attack on Edgerly v. Barker are strangely reminiscent of the thought processes of my learned friends who disagree with me. First, he said, the testator intended
this gift for such children as should reach 40, not 21, and the two groups might well
be quite different; thus, the court was really making a new will for the testator. He
does not point out that the alternative which he espouses would take the gift away
entirely. And what, said Gray, justifies cutting the contingency down to 21? Why
not be logical and make the period "twenty-one years after the death of all the students
now at Dartmouth College ?" And what will the court do with a gift "to the person
who shall be Chief Justice of New Hampshire 50 years from today ?" Gray described
the court as "taking the first step in that chase after the will-o'-the-wisp of general and
particular intent which the Court of King's Bench [in some dubiously relevant decisions on the Rule in Shelley's Case] began more than a hundred years ago, and which,
after long wanderings and stumblings and groanings of spirit, it has now finally
abandoned." Finally, "in New Hampshire, the more learned and acute the lawyer,
the greater the perplexity in which such cases would plunge him."
Well, for better or worse, Edgerly v. Barker has now been on the books for 69
years, the groanings of spirit of the New Hampshire courts have not been audible,
and the perplexity of the bar does not seem to be significantly greater than elsewhere.
In a footnote to § 884 Gray argues vehemently against an 1832 proposal of the English
Commissioners on the Law of Real Property to effect this same result by statute
and points with satisfaction to the failure of Parliament to act on this recommendation.
But, alas, this was in Gray's second edition; so the editor of his later editions rather
pathetically ends up this long footnote by adding: "But now see the Law of Prop.
Act (1925), Sec. 163 .

.

.

."

(This, of course, is the section which reduces to 21

age contingencies which would otherwise invalidate a gift.)
15 "I agree with most of Professor Leach's criticisms of the workings of the
Rule." SIMEs, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 64. "As to some criticisms and proposed
reforms of the common law rule against perpetuities there can be little disagreement."
Schuyler, Should The Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest?, 56 MIcH. L. REv.
683, 725 (1958). And see Law Reform Committee, Fourth Report, CMD. No. 18
passim (1956). The classic judicial statement of the basic defects in the Rule is that
of Lord Blanesburgh in Ward v. Van der Loeff, [1924] A.C. 653, 678.
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would have done so, and concludes from the list of citations collected
by Professor Thomas L. Waterbury 1 6 that "in these United States there
are not more than three or four casualties a year." He alludes to the
"hundreds of wills defeated because the T didn't know that two witnesses were required" and the fact that "many good barks founder
on such rocks as class gifts, divide and pay over, vesting, gifts to issue,
gifts to survivors, and so on and so on," and considers that by comparison the perpetuities failures are "a trifle." 17
To these learned gentlemen the only cases that count as demonstrations of the inadequacy of the Rule are those in which the gift is
invalidated by a reported appellate opinion. They would exclude the
following:
(a) Cases in which the gift is upheld on appeal after being
held invalid (or valid) in the trial court-for instance, Sears v.
8 the case that finally convinced the Massachusetts bar
Coolidge,"
that something should be done about the nonsense aspects of the
Rule. In this case the remainder in an inter vivos trust was
attacked on the ground that a widower of eighty-one whose only
two children were women of fifty-nine and fifty-five could have
more grandchildren before he died. The probate court held the
gift void. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed by taking a
"second look" on the basis of a power to amend the trust-and of
course no more grandchildren were born, as anyone with common
sense would know without being told. So the anti-reformists say:
see, Leach doesn't have an Innocent here to prove his Reign of
Terror. But the list of parties occupies four full pages of the
printed record (229 pages); and after all possible consolidations
eight briefs were submitted (417 pages) and six counsel argued
orally. The total fees allowed to dozens of counsel and guardians
ad litem in the main estate and a half-dozen subsidiary estates is
a matter of public record, but the additional fees charged to individual clients who stood to lose millions upon an affirmance will
never be known; let each have his guess as to the probable total.
16Waterbury, supra note 6, at 41. This is a whacking great 63-page article-by
a wide margin the most comprehensive and thorough treatment of the subject I have
seen. But, after catching me out on a couple of relatively minor points where I am
glad to confess error, it ends with espousal of wait-and-see. Doesn't it shake Mechem
just a bit that this scholarly analyst (". . . whose work in this area I so much
admire . . . . "-Mechem, supra note 1, at 969) comes to conclusions diametrically
opposed to Mechem's?
17 It is just as well that Mechem didn't get into the medical profession; had he
done so he would probably now be castigating Dr. Jonas Salk as a "polio enthusiast!'
and trying to block his work because deaths from heart disease and cancer are so
much more numerous.
were
Mr. Justice Frankfurter recalls that in the days when the Nine Old Men
contract,"
of
"freedom
of
name
the
in
legislation
minimum-wage
to
axe
the
laying
few cases
the apologists for the Court were saying, "well, numerically only relatively
knocked out legislation." But he also points out the ancillary effect of these decisions
103
in inhibiting state legislatures. PHILLII'S, FEI.ix FRANHFURTER REmINISCES
(1960). The analogy is obvious.
Is329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E.2d 563 (1952).
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I for one don't think much of a state of the law that "saves" a gift
by such attrition.
(b) Cases which are settled, either before or after a trial court
ruling. A Boston lawyer who wishes to remain anonymous (see
Canon of Ethics XXVII) says: "My office has annually an average
of three to five estates with perpetuities problems-perhaps a total
of fifty since World War II. Of these only one has gone through
to an appellate opinion. The rest have been settled, sometimes by
conceding a little, sometimes a lot to the claimant under the Rule."
Any practicing lawyer knows that the number of cases appearing
in appellate decisions is a far smaller percentage of the total than
the part of the iceberg that shows above the water. There is no
Vermont decision on the Rule; yet when I was testifying on behalf
of the Vermont statute practically every lawyer I talked to told
about cases where the Rule was involved and concessions had to be
made. One great trouble with the Rule is its all-or-nothing
aspect; if you lose, you lose all. It is the rarely courageous
lawyer who will recommend to an otherwise penniless remainderman that he (usually she) fight it out to the end instead of taking
a fifty-fifty offer.
(c) Cases where the issue exists but is never raised. This,
by the way, was the situation in Sears v. Coolidge until the trust
had been in existence nearly four decades. The trust was executed
in 1913 and the settlor died in 1920. The possible perpetuities
defect was known to several adults who would have benefited by
making claims under the Rule (and the defect was freely discussed
at Harvard Law School) ; but the trust dispositions were fair to
everyone and nobody wanted to raise a row in two closely knit
families. So the trust ran on unchallenged until 1951 when the
time for termination arrived, at which point a fiduciary raised the
issue which the families had determined to bury, and thus forced the
litigation. Perpetuities cases are for the most part family cases;
if litigation results, children are suing their parents, or nephews
their aunts, or cousins each other-and in most families this just
isn't done. So, my learned friends will say, what harm is done in
these cases? Only this: if the defect is voluntarily revealed or an
astute internal revenue agent spots it, then the person who has
not asserted his rights will find himself subjected to a gift tax
liability. Is this the way we want the Rule to work?
Any decision can have repercussions far beyond the immediate
parties. Take, for example, Haggerty v. City of Oakland,9 a little gem
19 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (1958), 73 HARV. L. REv. 1318 (1960). None
of the anti-reformists has protested this case in the two years since it has been out.
Perhaps Mechem and Bordwell haven't heard of it--as I hadn't until a fairly recent
trip to Los Angeles. Sparks describes both majority and dissenting opinions as "wellreasoned," finds no fault with the result, and approves the proposition that a commercial lease to commence at a date which might be beyond the period of perpetuities
is void. Sparks, Future Interests, in 1959 Ann. Survey Am. L., 35 N.Y.U.L. REv.
401, 408 (1960).
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that ought to gladden the hearts of my fundamentalist friends. This case
holds void a ten-year lease of a civic auditorium to commence "when
the auditorium shall be completed," there being a covenant by the city
to proceed with construction promptly in good faith. The decision has
thrown into question settled arrangements for store leases in dozens
of shopping centers and other new commercial construction. The
existence of the case can give utterly unjustified renegotiating leverage
to any lessor or lessee who feels his financial position strong enough to
threaten litigation.
But why should we have to give quantitative proof of the devastation worked by the Rule in its present form? It is precious little
solace to a group of children whose gifts fail through one of the nonsense doctrines to be told that they shouldn't worry because they
represent a rather small statistic.
LET'S TALK POLICY-AND ECONOMICS

Alienability of Land
The anti-reformists say that my various proposals-I call them
"mine" as a short-hand expression though regretfully I originated none
of them but merely espoused them-would extend the period of unmarketability of land titles because of contingent future interests. I share
their revulsion at the removal of land from its most productive use
through legal future interests; but if my friends are really serious about
this they should themselves become reformers on a much broader front.
All instruments which create present and future interests in land, other
than commercial leases, should be turned into trusts for sale after the
pattern of the Price Act in Pennsylvania or the Law of Property Act,
1925, in England.2 ° That is, the holder of a legal life tenancy should be
able to sell a fee simple in the land and transfer the future interests to the
proceeds of sale.
The worst offenders in this area are rights of entry on a fee and
possibilities of reverter, which in this country are exempt from the Rule.
The Massachusetts statute and its Connecticut and Maine counterparts
all put time limits on these interests as to future instruments; 21 and as
20 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1561 (1958).
For an exposition of the Law of
Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, see MGARRY, A MANUAL OF TME LAW o REAL
PROPERTY 87 (1946).
21 Sparks finds that I must suffer from a split personality since, in the same statute,
I recommended both easing the Rule generally by wait-and-see and putting clamps on
rights of entry and possibilities of reverter. Says he, "this statute can best be described by comparing it with the mythical man who mounted his horse and rode off
in all directions"
1954 ANN. SURVEY Am. L. 655, 664 (1955). A year later he
announced the discovery that I had left a sleeper in the statute by making it possible
to have executory interests that will not vest for 51 years. 1955 ANN. SuRVEY Am.
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to past instruments another Massachusetts statute 22 imposes a re-recording requirement which in time should knock out most of the offenders.
(I personally think that if a statute imposed time limitations on these
interests retroactively it would have an excellent chance of being held
constitutional, especially if it were accompanied by a legislative declaration that these ancient interests, usually buttressing an obsolete restrictive covenant, were destructive of the one basic community resource and
a threat to the tax base. But no legislature, as far as I know, has been
willing to try this out.) The Vermont legislature rejected my proposal
on this subject on the ground that it was not in pari materia;but I hope
they will now legislate on this problem in some comprehensive manner.
A Policy Against Long Trusts?
First, I must point out that the long trust question is not at issue in
discussion of these statutes. The reason is this (and I have said it time
and again and it has never been answered) :in all cases that have arisen
in this century where the gift has failed under the Rule, the instrument
could have been so drafted as to be unchallengable under the strictest
perpetuities doctrine unaided by legislation. Furthermore, I and my
reform colleagues, and all the anti-reformists too, would have so drafted
the instrument if they had been advising the donor. Thus, the type of
legislation I advocate will not extend the period of the Rule; it will
simply give to the donor who happens to choose a nonspecialist as his
counsel the same advantage as if he had gone to an experienced specialist.
If we are to restrict the duration of private trusts to a period less
than that which an expert estate planner can now achieve, let us (a)
find out what socio-economic objectives, if any, would be served by this
step, (b) apply it to everybody, not just capriciously destroy ultimate
gifts because of the ineptness of the draftsman, and (c) frame a type of
restriction which demonstrably accomplishes the socio-economic objectives decided upon.
Let us start our consideration of these issues by quoting Percy
Bordwell's contribution to economic and sociological analysis:
One who has sojourned in metropolitan Boston for a time
is struck with the atmosphere of settled wealth. The adventurous
L. 517, 526 (1956). I can state categorically that this is not so, as can be observed
not only from the text of the statute but also from the memorandum presented to
the legislature, which is part of the statutory history. LEACH & TUDOR, Op. Cit. S.rpra
note 3, at 211-13; Leach, supra note 12, at 1362-64. Simes and Taylor state the effect
of the section under discussion with complete accuracy and do not even refer to Sparks'
competing interpretation. SImEs & TAYLOR, THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY
LEGISLATION 209-10 (1960).
22 MAss. ANN.

LAWs ch. 260, § 31A (1959)

(enacted in 1956).
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spirit that once marked the Salem clippers seems nothing but a
nostalgic memory. Trusts, and these are likely to be spendthrift
trusts, are the order of the day. The estate planner is king. But
this is not the atmosphere of most of the rest of the United States.
Adventure still lurks. The intention of the settlor is not a jealous
god to be obeyed at all hazards. The estate planner is not king.
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania may well be a law unto themselves. Their perpetuity acts, it is believed, are not for import." 23
It seems a shame to tarnish with facts a paragraph of such lyrical
virtuosity; but in fairness to the reader I must perform this distasteful
duty. At the time Bordwell wrote, Connecticut and Maine had already
adopted the Massachusetts statute, New Hampshire decisions had
reached the same result, Delaware had for decades imposed fewer restrictions on the estate planner than Massachusetts, and Wisconsin imposed none at all. Furthermore, Vermont, Kentucky, Idaho, and Washington have since jumped on the reform bandwagon; and the British
Law Reform Committee has unanimously recommended a Massachusetts-type act to Parliament. If, as Bordwell says, the Massachusetts
estate planner is king, he is a very successfully aggressive monarch.
The Restatement concedes that "the basis or justification of this
assumption [that social welfare requires the imposition of restrictions
upon the fettering of property] has never been adequately explored and
has been seldom discussed." 24 And then, of course, the Reporter and
his advisers (all lawyers, no economists or sociologists) go right forward with a "rationale" of the whole law of perpetuities upon social
and economic bases. Adequate exploration is still for the future. 5
28 Bordwell, mipra note 2, at 435. I wish I could deny that Bordwell's strictures
upon "metropolitan Boston" (the adjective sideswipes Cambridge without actually
naming it) are based upon personal observation. But, alas, this is impossible. Shortly
after World War II we at Harvard invited the Bordwells to live among us, share our
labors and rejoice in what we then considered to be mutual affection and admiration.
So his opinions are based upon adequate personal observation even though one might
be permitted to question his conclusions. On our part I am sure that the warmth of
our feelings toward Bordwell is not so ephemeral that it can be affected by a peroration in the Rutgers Law Review. By the way, Sparks thinks that Bordwell's quoted
paragraph provides "a possible explanation" of "an unusual phenomenon." Sparks,
A Decade of Transition in Future Interests, 45 VA. L. REv. 493, 497 n.230 (1959).
244 RFSTATEMENT, PROPERTY 2129 (1944) (introductory note).
251 readily concede that it is more tedious to examine the national economy
factually than to hypothesize about it. But those of my friends who are going to base
arguments about perpetuities policy upon considerations of economics have just got
to do the studying. As a starter I would suggest they dip into the three volumes of
the HouSE CoMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., IST SESs., TAX RmvISION
OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAx BASE (Comm.
COMPENDIUM-COMI'PENDIUM3
Print 1959). I do not pretend to have read this; but it is not I who am making
economic arguments for a policy position on perpetuities. The reference comes from
my friends in the Department of Economics at Harvard; they have read it-and
participated in it-and they assure me, for example, that any argument based upon
a supposed deficiency in the funds available for risk investments cannot possibly be
supported.
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Arguments for Restricting the Duration of Trusts
What are the public reasons for restricting the duration of trusts?
They might be that:
Trusts tend to foster family economic empires of such power as to
threaten the public good.
Estate and income taxes, however, to say nothing of the antitrust
laws, have taken care of the economic power problem. Where are the
great family empires now-those built on the Rockefeller, Carnegie,
Ford, Harriman, Morgan, Vanderbilt fortunes? If a Harriman or a
Rockefeller gets elected as Governor of New York, does anyone suggest
that he bought his way in after the manner of the Boss Tweed period and
that he continues in office to feather the family nest? 26
Trusts tend to restrict the risk capital available to the economy; and risk
capital is in short supply.
Are either of these statements true? I doubt it, and at least would
have to hear proof. Nearly all modern trusts give the trustee unlimited
power of investment; and the modern trustee, faced with creeping inflation and the great income tax advantage of capital gains over dividends and interest, leans strongly to what have come to be known as
"growth" investments. Furthermore, anyone who is worried about
the availability of risk capital for "manufacture of jet airplanes, machinery operated by atomic energy, and scores of other things which,
in the long run, may lead to a higher and better civilization" 27 should
26
In reflecting upon Gray's "remorseless" (his word) attitude toward the Rule
it must not be forgotten that he was writing in 1886, the bad old days of the predatory
rich with no income tax or estate tax to hold in check the power accorded to them by
a laissez-faire system all too articulately expressed:
Vanderbilt (Cornelius): 'What do I care for the law? I got the power ain't I?"
Vanderbilt (W. H.): "The public be damned."

Morgan: "Men owning property should do what they like with it. I owe the public

nothing."
Bishop Lawrence (Mass.) : "In the long run it is only to the man of morality that
wealth comes . . . Godliness is in league with
riches."

(Quotes are from DULLES, THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1865 ch. 4 (1959).) It was
the period of the Marble Palace at Newport, Morgan's Corsair ("If you have to think
about the expense of a yacht you shouldn't own one") and the Fifth Avenue mansions,
of the Four Hundred flocking to the original production of The Mikado. It was not
the period of a Rockefeller succeeding a Harriman in dedicated public service, of the
Ford Foundation divesting itself of control of the Ford Company and devoting the
proceeds to worthy causes including Harvard, of Carnegie steel millions vying with
Nobel munitions millions in promoting world peace, or of a 91% top income tax
bracket and a 77% top estate tax bracket which tend to produce many of the last-named

phenomena and to cause a book of recent vintage to be entitled The Last Billionaire.
27 SIsES, op. cit. supra note 2, at 60.
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keep his eye on the "space industries" shares on the Big Board. Can
anyone view the rise of the stock market and fall of the bond market in
the last five years and conclude that investment in America is trending
toward conservatism? And what will the beneficiary do with his capital
if he gets it earlier? Probably put it right back into one of the investment trusts.
Trusts restrict expenditures for consumer goods to income from the
trust securities,whereas it is often in the public interest that capital be so
spent.
While this is perhaps true, I should have thought that since the beginning of World War II we had been trying to restrict or "syphon off"
buying power to avoid inflation. Besides, if a trust is properly drafted,
invasion of the principal to meet needs of the beneficiary will always be
included; and these needs are likely to crop up. when a sound economy
dictates that buying power should be increased.
It is socially desirable that the wealth of the world be controlled by its
living members and not by the dead.
This argument gets us into semantics. Obviously when A dies
leaving property to B in trust for C for life, remainder to C's children,
the wealth is controlled by the living: as to management by the trustee, as to expenditure of income (and perhaps some principal) by the
beneficiaries. Now, it is true that C can't take the remainder away from
his children. Perhaps it is socially desirable that he should be able to;
but this would have to be argued out-and then, if an affirmative answer
were given, more drastic restrictions than any yet suggested would have
to be imposed.
It is socially undesirable that some individuals should have assured incomes and be protected from the economic struggle for existence.
As to the assured incomes this is an argument against all inheritable
wealth; Tommy Manville's inglorious career is dependent, not necessarily upon a long trust, but upon the inheritability of the millions his
old man made in asbestos. As to protection from the economic struggle,
this is a relic of the period when old age insurance was considered socialistic paternalism; as Simes has put it, the welfare state "is not organized on a theory of survival of the fittest, but of survival of the weak." 28
28 SimFs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 57.
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Is there a justification for prospective hypothetical determination of
validity as of testator's death instead of contemporaneous factual determination at a later time?
From 1787 when Jee v. Audley 2 first set forth the rule that a court
must blind its eyes to facts that have actually occurred when prior
estates end, nobody, not even Gray, not even the Restatement with its
passion for "rationales," ever tried to rationalize this rule. I pointed
this out in 1952, so some of those who don't like these statutes have now
gone to work to fill the gap nunc pro tunc.
Bordwell hasn't entered this contest. Indeed he apologizes for
lee v. Audley: "Lord Kenyon [of Jee v. Audley] was an entirely different type from Lord Nottingham [of the Duke of Norfolk's Case]."
He liked to say 'No.' Furthermore he had a gift of hasty generalization that was likely to make his generalizations stick because of their
very oracular character. The result he reached in lee v. Audley, it is
believed, would not have appealed to Lord Nottingham." With all of
this I agree. But in Bordwell's mind, "the question is whether his
[Leach's] cure isn't worse than the disease." And the reader can guess
the answer: he thinks the changes I propose, though not revolutionary,
"are in the wrong direction." Here Bordwell and I part company.
Mechem goes in for assertion: "there is a strong policy in favor
of making possible the determination of the validity of interests at the
earliest possible moment, which in the case of wills is the death of the
testator." 31 Why? And whose policy? Certainly not that of the
Pennsylvania courts-or the Massachusetts courts either-both of
which refuse to pass upon the validity of a gift under the Rule Against
Perpetuities until prior estates have ended.32 Mechem brushes off these
inconvenient holdings by saying, "courts are often lazy and willing to
put off anything that can be put off" and "a bad practice should not be
perpetuated by bad legislation." 33 It's still just assertion.
Simes makes an extraordinary argument, and since he has published it three times in identical terms I must conclude that he is deadly
29 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787).
30 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 26, 36 Eng. Rep. 690 (1682).
31
Mechem, supra note 1, at 979. Following this quote the reader will find a page
and a half of discussion before the author turns to a new point. The reader must
examine this for himself; to me it adds up to no more than unsupported assertion.
32 B.M.C. Durfee Trust Co. v. Taylor, 325 Mass. 201, 89 N.E.2d 777 (1950);
Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 Atl. 85 (1938).
33
Mechem, supra note 1, at 979, 980. Does he really mean this? And does he
attribute similar motivation to the rule of the Supreme Court of the United States
that a constitutional determination will be postponed if any other basis for disposing
of the case exists? See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis). I should think this little quip might reduce the good
professor's popularity among the black-robed gentry in Harrisburg and Washington.
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serious about it. He says that under a wait-and-see statute there will
be no one who can prevent the trustee from embezzling the trust estate
in collusion with the life tenant, since neither the remaindermen nor the
reversioner are certain to have an interest in view of the fact that the
validity of the remainder depends upon future events. 4 There is no
citation of authority; and I do not believe that Simes' view of probate or equity procedure applies in any state of the Union. Both the
remaindermen and the reversioner would have to be parties to a court
accounting (How else could an honest trustee protect himself?); and
all of them would be appropriate petitioners in a bill in equity to protect
the corpus of the trust against embezzlement 3 5 -to say nothing of the
local district or county attorney who normally shows official interest in
thievery. If Simes were sitting as judge in that probate or equity court
would he really say, as he visualizes the ruling of his hypothetical judge,
"we cannot do anything for you, for your interest may be void ab initio
34

This argument is made in COMMITTEE ON RULES AGAINST PERPETUITIES, ABA
SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST LAW, LEGISLATORS' HANDBOOK ON
PERPETUITIES 38 (1958) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATORS' HANDBOOK]; 3 SIMES &
SMITH, op. cit. mpra note 2, § 1230, at 131; Simes, supra note 2, at 185-86. In each
of these publications there appears a footnote as follows: "It may be argued that it is
better to deny an action to [the remaindermen] than to hold their interests void, as
would be done under the common law rule." On this Simes is quite right; it not only
may be argued but hereby is argued. "In answer it may be said that it is better to
give a resulting interest to [the reversioner] than to allow the trustee to embezzle
the fund." On this he is quite wrong; both the remaindermen and the reversioner
would be parties to a trustee's petition for allowance of his account and would have
standing to petition for an accounting or for removal of the trustee.
35 1 should not have thought it necessary to cite authority for the proposition
that any court would consider both the remaindermen and the reversioner necessary
parties to a petition to allow the trustee's account and proper parties to bring a petition
to surcharge or remove the trustee. Since Simes is discussing Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania I will limit the references to those states.
In Massachusetts, notice of a trustee's petition for allowance of his account must
be given to a long list of categories of persons "and to other persons who are or may
become interested and who shall have filed with the accountant and the register of
probate a request in writing for notice of proceedings on accounts." (Emphasis
added.) MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 206, §24(5) (1955); 2 NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF
ESTATES AND

FIDUCIARY LAW

IN

MASSACHUSETTS

§ 285 (1958).

"Persons having

contingent interests are persons interested in the trust and in the accounts (citations
omitted) unless indeed such interests are so utterly unsubstantial as to amount to
nothing more than 'a film of mist." Young v. Tudor, 323 Mass. 508, 511, 83 N.E.2d
1, 3 (1948). See also Porotto v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 321 Mass. 638, 75 N.E.2d 17
(1947), which indicates the solicitude of the Massachusetts courts for admitting to
the proceedings all persons having any vestige of an interest. It will be recalled
that Guy Newhall was a co-draftsman and co-sponsor of the Massachusetts statute;
if it had presented difficulties with probate procedure he would have been the first to
spot and correct them.
As to Pennsylvania I have sought the aid of Philip A. Br~gy. He agrees with
my position, citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.703-.704 (1950) ; Gill's Estate, 293
Pa. 199, 142 At. 207 (1928); cf. BR-GY, INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES ACTS OF
1947, at 5156 (1949). He adds that the proposition is so obvious that it would be
difficult to find a case where it had been contested. He reminds me that the problem
is not new in Pennsylvania because the Pennsylvania courts, like those of Massachusetts, will not pass on the perpetuities point until termination of prior estates.
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under the Rule against Perpetuities; we must 'wait and see' "? 31 I
don't believe it for a minute.
If the reader still thinks there is some justification for the mighthave-been rule, let him now consider the situations where without aid
of statute the courts already wait and see:
(a) Where there are alternative contingencies, one remote
and one not, we wait to see which occurs."7
(b) Where there is a power to amend or a power to appoint,
we wait to see whether the power will be exercised and in passing
upon the amendment or appointed interest examine all facts at the
time of amendment or appointment; " and, where the power is not
exercised, in passing upon the interest in default we examine all
facts at the date the power expires.3 9
(c) It is more intriguing to the pedagogue than important to
the profession that two familiar and respected cases call for a waitand-see solution: Evers v. Challis4 (obsolete except where the
rule of destructibility of contingent remainders is in force) and
1i the Matter of Homer (obsolete since New York has abandoned
the two-life rule) .41

Of course the really important item in this list is (b), for the
vast majority of modem well-drawn trusts, testamentary or inter vivos,
contain some type of power which compels the court to wait and see.
So really the chief function of the wait-and-see statutes is to extend to
the relatively few trusts not containing powers the rules which already
apply to the relatively numerous trusts that do contain them. This is
a completely exact statement of the effect of the Massachusetts-type
statutes. The Pennsylvania-type statutes will probably turn out to have
a slightly greater effect, but not much.
Is there any tendency among the wealthy to produce trusts which exceed the period of perpetuities?
In thirty-five years of practice, largely connected with estate work,
I have never found a testator or settlor who had any wish to exceed the
limits of the Rule in its most severe application. Is this atypical? We
3

6 See note 34 supra.
Gray v. Whittemore, 192 Mass. 367, 78 N.E. 422 (1906) ; In re Curryer's Will
Trusts, [1938] 1 Ch. 952; 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.54 (Casner ed. 1952).
88In re Warren's Estate, 320 Pa. 112, 182 At. 396 (1936), overruling Smith's
Appeal, 88 Pa. 492 (1879) ; 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.35 (Casner ed. 1952).
39 Sears v. Coolidge, 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E.2d 563 (1952) ; 6 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 24.36 (Casner ed. 1952).
40 7 H.L.C. 531, 11 Eng. Rep. 212 (H.L. 1859).
41237 N.Y. 489, 143 N.E. 655 (1924). The significance of this case and of Evers
v. Challis, mipra note 40, is pointed out in Note, Cardozo, Horner and "Wait and
See," 8 SRAcusa L. PEv. 211 (1957).
37
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can test the answer by looking to Delaware and Wisconsin where a
testator or settlor can have a trust as long as he pleases-in Delaware
because of a 1938 statute causing the period of perpetuities to run from
the exercise, not creation, of all powers; in Wisconsin because its New
York-type statute ("suspension of the power of alienation") is construed to put no limit on trusts where the trustee has a power of sale.4"
As to Delaware I know of no complaints in the twenty-two years since
the statute was passed. One Milwaukee lawyer has expressed a fear
that Wisconsin trusts will get out of hand in length, mostly for tax reasons; " but, upon inquiry, he states that he finds no sentiment for legislation and that "even the Supreme Court has indicated no particular
need for change." So I guess the Milwaukee Braves, the Green Bay
Packers, and all those breweries and herds of dairy cattle will continue
to be exposed to the ghoulies and ghasties that people the nightmares
of my anti-reformist friends. (I wonder whether this will cause Percy
Bordwell to hurl at the state of the La Follettes the anathema with which
he has afflicted the commonwealth of the Cabots and Lowells.44 ) But
the important thing is that inquiries at the Wisconsin bar indicate that
their clients just don't want to create over-long trusts and that they are
advising their clients that this decision is wise because of the unpredictability of tax and other features in the remote future. It seems there
45
just isn't any problem.
Still and all, I think Wisconsin should have a restriction on future
interests (I would recommend the common-law Rule as modified by
the Vermont statute) for a very practical reason: our present estate and
inheritance tax system depends upon the wealth of the community going
through the wringer every so often, and in the main it depends upon the
Rule Against Perpetuities and its relatives to prevent the intervals from
being too long. If Wisconsin stays out of line in this matter, and if
some taxpayers, or even just a couple of big ones, abuse the privilege
for a supposed tax advantage, the Internal Revenue Code will be
amended to eliminate the abuse, and the amendment may well do harm
outside, as well as inside, Wisconsin. Special provisions of the Code
42 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 501 (1953) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 230.14-.15 (1957),
In re Walker's Will, 258 Wis. 65, 45 NAV.2d 94 (1950) ; Becker v. Chester, 115 Wis.
90, 91 N.W. 87 (1902).
43 Dede, Perpetuities it Private Trusts in Wisconsin, 42 MARQ. L. Rxv. 514
(1959).
44 See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
45 1 have received from Dede and from two other Milwaukee lawyers samples of
the longest trusts of which they are aware. All of them could be accommodated
within the common-law Rule, nutatis mutandis, by standard drafting devices--except
that in the future there might be trouble with the exercise of special and testamentary
powers of appointment. As to this matter, these trusts may well run into tax difficulties under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2041 (a) (3).
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were enacted to eliminate tax advantages in the Delaware statute, and
46
these have been a nuisance to everyone.
Is there need for a Rule Against Perpetuitiesat all?
As a rule of property, I doubt it-and so, oddly enough, does
Mechem.4 7 But I share his visceral impression that there is something
wrong in permitting a testator to exercise the power of the dead hand
a century after his death-and the fact that he can do it right now under
the Rule doesn't make it any righter. (As Mechem felicitously puts it,
"the rule doesn't conspicuously stand in the way of unsocial people with
good lawyers.")
However, as indicated with reference to Wisconsin, I feel that a
rule against perpetuities of approximately the standard length is an adjunct to our system of estate, inheritance and gift taxation, and that if
we didn't have one the revenue laws would have to be revised with a lot
of unnecessary stress and strain. So I am for having a rule against
perpetuities that blocks the perpetual family trust but doesn't do so
through destructive methods that have no relation to the policy objective.
I am sure that most of us, if charged with framing a rule against
perpetuities de novo, would not use the twenty-one-year period. Twentyone as the age of majority is a relic of feudal times, pragmatically determined by the physical ability to wear heavy armor, wield the weapons
of the day, and sustain trial by combat. 48 We too are entitled to be
pragmatic under the conditions of our own time. The test should be:
at what age is it reasonable to expect that a man or woman will be mature enough to handle capital funds? Surely twenty-one, the age of a
junior in college, is too young. Thirty is a good deal more realistic;
perhaps thirty-five. But I have no urge to summon a crusade to change
twenty-one to some higher figure; the present scope of the Rule is quite
adequate for the expert draftsman, and wait-and-see and cy pres statutes
can protect the public from the inexpert.
THE "LIVES IN BEING" PROBLEM

The Pennsylvania Statute
All of the anti-reformists say that under the Pennsylvania statute
(measuring the period by "actual rather than possible events") it is
46
Ir.
REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 2041 (a) (3), 2514(d) ; CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING
565 47
(2d ed. 1956).
Mechem, supra note 1, at 968-69.
48 See James, The Age of Majority, 4 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 22 (1960). But there
is no universality in the age of majority, either at a particular moment of time or in
a particular country. The British sovereign still attains majority at 18. Magna
Carta seems to mark the first appearance of 21, the age having been 15 in the ninth
and tenth centuries. French nobles attained majority at 17. The Roman law put
the age at 25.
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impracticable to determine who are the lives in being. Mechem, for
example, visualizes himself in the classroom with his students asking
"What life?" In that case, says he, "I would be floored because no one
yet knows the answer to that question." Imagine! Mechem never discusses anything in the classroom to which the answer is not known?
If any among the readers of this Article have the patience to go
through the anti-reformist literature I suggest reading it with the following question in mind: are the writers really trying to solve the problem or are they trying to make the statute look bad? As a corollary
question: are the hypothetical cases with which any writer deals the ones
that actually occur or are they museum pieces he has dreamed up with
a view to announcing in mock dismay that he is "floored"? It has
been wisely remarked-I wish I could locate the quote-that any sound
project can be made to look absurd if it is absurdly carried out.4
The anti-reformists, and in this instance Simes too, all adopt the
view that under the Pennsylvania statute you wait until the questionable interest vests and then go back to see whether you can find a life,
out of a twenty-one-year old New York telephone directory for example,
which was in being at the critical period and which has expired less
than twenty-one years ago. °
Because this Article is basically an answer to Mechem, I deal with
his treatment of. this thesis. He postulates a bequest to testator's widow
for life and then to his brother's children who reach twenty-five. Then
he asks whether the gift will be good if, by waiting and seeing, it turns
out that all children reach twenty-five within twenty-one years after the
death of (a) the widow, (b) the brother, (c) the lawyer whom the
testator expresses the wish to have employed, (d) the testator's gardener whom the testator cautions as to the care of the hedge on his
estate, (e) "and so on." 51
49
Even Simes (who, as I have said, recognizes that legislative correctives are
necessary and with whom I believe I could work out mutually satisfactory legislation)
is drawn into the pattern of discussing the Pennsylvania statute with reference to such
grotesqueries as a gift "to such of the testator's lineal descendants as are alive 120
years after testator's death." LEGISLAroRs' HANDBOOK 39.
50 "If the lives are selected at the end rather than at the beginning, longer lives
will likely be chosen. The draftsman who selects twelve healthy babies at the inception of the future interest for measuring lives may find that they all die within six
months. [I hope my learned friend never applies for employment as an actuary.]
But if he could select the lives when the contingency happens, he could never fail to
find long ones. On this matter, hindsight is inevitably better than foresight." Simes,
in LEGISLAToRs' HAND00K 39. The New York Telephone Directory crops up id. at
39; SImES & SMITH, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1230, at 132; Simes, supra note 2, at 187.
51 Mechem, Further Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation, 107
U. PA. L. Rtv. 965, 981 (1959). Since it is my chosen profession to nurture and
protect the young I must express indignant disbelief when Mechem says that his
Pennsylvania "average student" would say that the widow was measuring life because
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Let's answer Mechem's question with regard to this case which he
apparently considers so difficult as to demonstrate the folly of the statute.
My guess is that the court's opinion would read somewhat as follows:
"In this case the measuring lives are the widow and testator's
brother-the widow because there can be no distribution of principal until her death and also because under our settled practice,
Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, we will not pass upon the validity
of the remainder until the end of the life estate; and the brother
because no further children can be born after his death. If, at the
death of the survivor of the widow and the brother, it appears either
that (a) no further children were born to the brother after T's
death or (b) that all are over the age of four at the death of such
survivor, then the gift is good. If the will contains no express
disposition of the income after the widow's death, we shall imply a
gift of intermediate income to the children from time to time living and to the estates of those who have reached twenty-five and
died. If the contingencies are not favorable at the death of the survivor of the widow and the brother, immediate distribution of the
principal will be made to those receiving the income, under section
4(e) (3) of the statute. If a child should reach twenty-five after the
death of the widow but before the death of the brother, the
Orphan's Court should make a distribution of principal to such
child and should exercise its discretion as to exacting a forthcoming bond in the light of its judgment as to the probability of birth
of further children which might reduce the size of the distributee's
ultimate share. We consider the suggestion of counsel that the
testator's lawyer or his gardener 'and so on' should be used as
measuring lives to be so patently frivolous as to violate the standards of dignity which this court is entitled to expect from members
of the bar."
Mechem and the other anti-reformists have unaccountably neglected two sources which indicate that no such nonsense as they propose
was intended by the official committee (appointed under statutory authority) which prepared this statute-and therefore, on recognized
principles of statutory construction, that no such intention can be attributed to the legislature:
(a) The Report of the Joint State Government Commission
which recommended the wait-and-see statute here under discussion
makes the following comment on the relevant section: "this subsection

.

.

.

is intended to disturb the common law rule as little

as possible, but to make actualities at the end of the period, rather
than possibilities as of the creation of the interest, govern and to
"she is mentioned in the will and so one of the parties involved" and implies that his
students would apply the same reasoning to the lawyer, the gardener, and so on. If
he doesn't get burned in effigy on the campus for that, his students are not worthy
inheritors of the spirit of the Whiskey Rebellion.
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provide a more equitable disposition of void gifts." 52 This comment also appears in Purdon's Statutes immediately after the section in question.
(b) In 1949 Philip A. Br6gy who was Associate Research
Consultant to the Committee-operating under a fellowship from
the University of Pennsylvania Law School-wrote a compendious
book on the Intestate, Wills and Estates Acts of 1947, including
the perpetuities section. In this he devotes several pages to the
selection of lives-in-being under the statute and says: "under the
statute, it is submitted that lives in being reasonably related to the
gift should be used in measuring the period for actual vesting."
He then deals with four difficult Pennsylvania cases-actual cases
from real people, not concoctions contrived to prove a point-and
disposes of them in a practical manner which makes sense 53to me
and, I predict, will make sense to the Pennsylvania courts.
And what do you do where there are no relevant lives? Easy, use
twenty-one years. This disposes of a case suggested by Simes: "to the
B Church in fee simple; but if the land should ever cease to be used
for church purposes, then to C in fee simple." " After twenty-one years
the B Church has an indefeasible fee. The only Pennsylvania case on
the statute so far is a nisi prius decision on an option, unlimited in time,
which was in fact exercised within (a) twenty-one years-actually six,
and (b) the lives of both parties.5 5 The opinion suggests that the
52 Quoted in BIlGY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 5251. This sentence from the report
is quoted by Simes, supra note 2, at 183, not as a guide to construction of the statute,
but as proof that the Committee did not realize "how revolutionary this piece of
legislation is."
53 BR.GY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 5268-72. Asserting a negative is notoriously
risky, so as to the neglect of Br~gy I will only state that: (a) I do not recall any
reference to his book by the anti-reformists, (b) the book is not cited by Mechem,
writing in the School where part of the book was written, and (c) the book is not
cited in the Legislators' Handbook. As to the probable acceptance of the Br~gy book
as a source of statutory interpretation, it should be noted that the Introduction by
the Chairman of the Advisory Committee states as to Brggy and his colleague M.
Paul Smith: "Probably no two persons know as well as they the detailed provisions
of the acts and the reasons which have caused the adoption of particular sections and
clauses." BRtGY, op. cit. supra note 10, at v. It has been held that the Commissioners'
comments may be considered in construing the statutes. Martin's Estate, 365 Pa.
280, 283, 74 A.2d 120, 122 (1950).
54
LE ISLATos' HANDBOO 39-40. Using the telephone-directory assumption Simes
has this title being tied up for 125 years by the statute. What he does not remind
the reader is that right now this title can be tied up forever in exactly this way under
established perpetuities doctrine: the grantor conveys to the B Church so long as
the premises are used for church purposes, and then conveys the possibility of reverter
to C. Indeed, two recent decisions indicate that this can be done all at once in a will
by treating the testamentary clauses as if they operated successively instead of simultaneously. Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922
(1950) ; Knowles v. South County Hosp., 140 A.2d 499 (RI. 1958). See 6 AmERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.62 (Casner ed. 1952).
55
Mumma v. Hinkle, 138 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Philadelphia) 321 (Pa. C.P.
1958). Sparks joins the telephone-directory group by asking: "What would have been
the result if the option had not been exercised until after the death of both parties to
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option would be good for the lives of both parties plus twenty-one years,
but plainly this was of no consequence in the particular litigation because if the statute was applied at all the exercise of the option within
six years brought it within the period of the life of either party or
twenty-one years. I do not consider that in such a situation the lives
of the parties to this option are "reasonably related" to it under Br~gy's
test; or, to put it differently, I do not consider that a commercial option
between individuals should be treated differently from one between
corporations. So, had I been writing that opinion, I would have rested
the case on the twenty-one-year period.
Massachusetts-type Statutes
Simes declares that no lives-in-being problem exists with the
Massachusetts statute and its counterparts in Maine and Connecticut,
inasmuch as the wait-and-see principle is applied only up to the termination of the life estates; 11 and none of the anti-reformers disagree.
Vermont-type Statutes
These statutes have the same language which the critics of Pennsylvania find so ambiguous; that is, they declare that "the period of
perpetuities shall be measured by actual rather than possible events."
The 1960 Kentucky statute adds: "provided, however, the period shall
not be measured by any lives whose continuance does not have a causal
relationship to the vesting or failure of the interest." 17 This addition
seems to me a good idea, especially if it makes my learned friends
happier. But I expect that the Vermont and Washington courts will
reach the same result without the additional clause; indeed, I recommend that they do, if the problem comes before them. But I anticipate
very little litigation under these statutes; the ability to reform the
limitation "to approximate most closely the intention of the creator of
it, but if at the time of exercise a stranger could have been found who was actually
in being when the option contract was entered into? If the option is never exercised,
at what point may the optioner convey a marketable title free of the option?" My
answer: after 21 years the option cannot be exercised and the optioner has a marketable title. But I also answer that this is not a real problem. Commercial options do
not in practice constitute a threat to alienability. And Sparks should know this
better than any of us. In the Empire State where he teaches there are no time
restrictions on options. In re Waterfront, 246 N.Y. 1, 157 N.E. 911 (1927) ; 6 AERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.56 (Casner ed. 1952).
56 LEGISLATORS' HANDBOoK

38 n.4.

Professor Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., of the University of Kentucky College of Law
took a leading part in sponsoring this statute in collaboration with prominent members
of the bar and the judiciary. They all went through the character-building experience
of actually getting the statute enacted. Bravo! Governor Bert T. Combs, a former
judge of the Court of Appeals, not only gave his official approval to the statute after
it had passed the legislature but also actively sponsored the bill.
57
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the interest" so narrows the area of controversy that the parties are
quite likely to conclude that litigation is not worth its cost.
This leads to a worthwhile observation: Mechem finds the Pennsylvania statute faulty and predicts that it will be "repealed or modified." 58 Well, there he is on the Pennsylvania Turnpike with the
legislature at Harrisburg about a hundred miles down the road; and
there is the Kentucky statute as a guide to modifying the Pennsylvania
law so that the troubles are removed. What are we waiting for? Is
it the function of the profession to take pot-shots at laws alleged to be
defective, or to go out and get the defects removed?
THE INFECTIOUS INVALIDITY PROBLEM

First, let's define the problem. When part of the gifts in a will
or trust violate the Rule, the courts inquire whether what is left can
stand by itself (the void gift passing into the residue or as a reversion)
without serious distortion of the dispositive scheme of the testator or
settlor. If the answer is negative then other gifts-prior, concurrent, or
subsequent-are also stricken out.5 9 Now this does not happen very
often; but when it does, mark well the method by which the court
proceeds as given in the Restatement, for the reader may find therein
the solution to all difficulties. The court, says the Restatement, will ask
itself the following question:
"If the [testator or settlor] . . . should now examine his proposed plan of disposition with the parts excised therefrom which
have been found to offend the rule against perpetuities, would he
decide that his original scheme of disposition would be more
closely approximated by invalidating all, . . . or part, . . . of

the balance, or by allowing the balance to take effect in accordance
with its terms . . .? Whichever of these three modes of pro-

cedure is judicially ascertained to be most likely to accord with the
desires of the [testator or settlor] . . . is followed out. The dispositive planning of [testators and settlors] . . . is thus given

the fullest possible effectiveness consistent with the social regulation
implicit in the rule against perpetuities." o
Simes and Sparks say that if you wait and see whether the facts
make the future interest valid, then if it proves invalid there is no way
58 Mechem, supra note 51, at 980.

59 6 AmERICAx LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 24.8-.52 (Casner ed. 1952) ; 4 RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 402 (1944); 3 SIaMs & SMITir, FuTuRE INTERESTS §§ 1262-64, 1943 (2d
ed. 1956).
(Emphasis added.)
604 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §402, comment a (1944).
Simes was one of the advisers. Id. at iii. The quoted passage is specifically adopted
in Taylor v. Dooley, 297 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Ky. 1956).
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to correct distortion by invalidating prior interests which have already
The reply is that, first, this is not a real
taken effect and expired."
problem that actually arises. Simes has made this point three times
from 1953 to 1958, including his very carefully prepared Cooley
Lectures at Michigan, 2 and all three times he has used the same
hypothetical case as an illustration. I just don't believe he can find a
real case where (a) a gift would be void under the wait-and-see rule
and (b) unacceptable distortion would be caused by the interests which
have previously expired.6 3 This is a challenge. If Simes and Sparks
turn up one case I shall be surprised; but one case will not make me
think the problem is important. Second, in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts the problem raised by Simes and Sparks already existed prior
to the statutes, because of the decisions refusing to pass on validity
"
And
until the expiration of life estates-and no trouble has resulted.
61 LEGISLATORS' HANDBOOK 40; 3 SIMES & SMITH, Op. Cit. supra note 59, § 1230,
at 134; Simes, Is the Ride Against PerpetuitiesDoomed? The "Wait and See" Doctrine, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 179, 189 (1953); Sparks, A Decade of Transition in Future
Interests, 45 VA. L. REv. 493, 496 (1959).
62 See note 61 supra.
63 1 say this with some confidence because when I came to write the relevant
sections of American Law of Property I discovered that I couldn't find a really good
case and finally plagiarized a version of Simes' own hypothetical from his earlier
edition. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.52 (Casner ed. 1952). The cases
cited by Simes (preceded by the telltale "See") consist of one which both he and I
have publicly criticized (3 SIMES & SMITH, op. cit. supra note 59, § 1262 n.25; 6
AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.50 n.2 (Casner ed. 1952)), and another where the
precepts of the Restatement, Simes and myself seem clearly to be violated, as Simes
himself notes at 3 SIMEs & SMITH, op. cit. supra note 59, § 1262 n.26. The cases are
Millikin Natl Bank v. Wilson, 343 Ill. 55, 174 N.E. 857 (1931); In re Richards'
Estate, 283 Mich. 484, 278 N.W. 657 (1938). Sparks cites Taylor v. Dooley, 297
S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1956), which is a neat example to prove my point. There was a gift
of one-half of testator's realty to his daughter Marian for life, remainder to her
children for their lives, remainder to her grandchildren in fee; the other half was given
to his son in fee. Now this is practically Simes' (and my) hypothetical case. Bound
by the Jee v. Avdley rule, the court invalidated the ultimate remainder and (questionably, as it seems to me) also knocked out the two prior life estates; then, to prevent
distortion also knocked out the son's gift and caused the whole to pass by intestacy.
But the point is this: testator died in 1941 at which time Marian was 43 years old
and had a single child, aged 18; up io the time the action was filed (date not given
but inferrable within reasonable limits from the 1957 date of appellate opinion) no
further children had been born to her-as anyone would expect. So, under wait-andsee in any possible version, there was no violation at all.

64 Sparks seems to forget this when he notes that "the infectious invalidity doctrine is definitely operative in Massachusetts" and that we have a wait-and-see statute,
and he wonders how those two will mix. Sparks, supra note 61, at 496 n.229. The
case he cites is New England Trust Co. v. Sanger, 337 Mass. 342, 149 N.E.2d 598
(1958). If the "infectious invalidity" enthusiasts (may I use the word too?) expect
any comfort out of this case they had better read it carefully. It made my co-author
Owen Tudor very unhappy, because the result was unfavorable to his client, and the
opinion compounded the injury by citing copiously his works and mine. Briefly, two
trust instruments were executed by the settlor, one in 1913 (which had a void remainder) and one in 1930 (which, despite a rather amusing near-error, was all valid).
Both instruments had the same dispositive scheme. By knocking out all of the 1913
instrument, a reversion in the settlor resulted; and this was happily disposed of by
the 1930 trust. The court points out that infectious invalidity has been applied in
Massachusetts only in a single case and approves Gray's statement that "if anything
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third, if we really have to make a choice of evils between the occasional
case (and they have still to find just one) where distortion results
through ignoring infectious invalidity, and the many cases where gifts
are defeated (or compromises forced) through the Jee v. Audley rule, I
choose the former.
But no such choice is necessary. All that is needed is to adopt the
cy pres principle as in Vermont. The reader will have noted that,
according to the rationale in the Restatement, the infectious invalidity
rule is simply a cy pres doctrine based upon an assumption of invalidity
of the gift-the court considers which arrangement would "more closely
approximate" the testator's wishes-very nearly the words of the
Vermont statute. Just turn this idea around and perform the same
process on the assumption of validity of the gift within the limits of the
Rule-and the job is done; since there is no invalidity at all, but only
reformation, there is no infectious invalidity problem.
THE CY PRES STATUTES-VERMONT, WASHINGTON,
KENTUCKY, ETC.65

Perpetuities reform was first subjected to group discussion at the
ABA meeting of 1953. At that meeting everyone agreed that the
current state of the law was a mess and that something should be done
about it. Simes was for a cy pres statute. I concurred on principle
but doubted that legislatures could be convinced; so I was prepared to
settle for wait-and-see."6 But there was no harm in giving it a try, for
in my view cy pres offers a total and simple solution. And lo, the
Vermont legislature bought the idea, and the Washington and Kentucky
legislatures followed with statutes that were surprises to me until I
read about them.
is now well settled in the law it is that a life estate, good in itself, is not destroyed
by the remainder over being bad for remoteness or any other reason." However,
the court adds that where, as in Sanger, the judicial knife can perform painless and
healing surgery, the operation will be undertaken.
65 The "etc." covers Idaho and the New Hampshire judicial cy pres doctrine. It
is particularly appropriate that Kentucky should have enacted a cy pres statute, because
it was former Judge James Quarles of the Chancery Court at Louisville who first
suggested the cy pres idea and who developed it with scholarly analogies that have

never been challenged-and right in Sparks' front yard too. Quarles, The Cy Pres
Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule against Perpetuitiesand Trusts
for Accumulation, 21 N.Y.U.L. REv. 384 (1946). Probably, also in Sparks' front
yard, we should count his Dean in the cy pres camp. Niles, Two Lives Down-and
Goal to Go, Change in New York Perpetuities Rule Appraised-Further Reform
Suggested, 98 TRUSTS & ESTATES 104, 108 (1959). Niles doesn't like wait-and-see,
but his reasons suggest that he has taken the anti-reformists somewhat too seriously.
Still, if he can get a cy pres statute enacted in New York our troubles are over. Every
other state would fall in line within a five-year period.
66 PROBATE & TRUST LAW Div., ABA SECTION bF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND
TRUST LAW 83-93 (1953) ; LEACH & TUDOR, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITrES 201-02

(1957).
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Meanwhile, Simes had backed away from cy pres, but not very far.
His position is now as follows,

7

with my comments in bracketed

italics:
"Should there be a blanket cy pres provision such as [the
Vermont statute]

.

. . which would allow the court to rewrite

the limitations in all cases of invalidity? Against this it can be
urged that a blanket rule would necessitate litigation in all such
cases before interested parties could determine the effect of limitations. [I doubt this. The big incentive to perpetuities litigation,
and to the threat of litigation that forces serious concession by way
of compromise, is its all-or-nothing character. If the contestant
wins, the proponent gets nothing. But when the issue is limited
to the question of what reformation within the limits of the Rule
will most closely approximate the testator's intent, the spectrum
of possible choices is very narrow, hardly worth litigating. Try
it out on half a dozen cases and see.] Moreover, it might mean
that the judge could rewrite the will in a manner which would be
entirely unpredictable. [Same comment. The court is limited by
the statutory requirement to provide the closest approximation to
the testator'sintent. The spectrum is narrow.] Doubtless, even
this would be preferable to holding the future interest totally void.
[Agree.] The alternative to a blanket provision would be a
number of specific statutes which would take care of particular
situations commonly arising. Then, as new situations arise which
would appear to be sufficiently common to call for a rule, other
specific statutes dealing with them could be enacted. [The problem is one of legislative practicality. It is very, very hard work
to get one of these statutes passed-and to come back for amendments 'as new situations arise' is just asking too much of overworked committees.] Of course, it would also be possible to have
the specific provisions, and, in addition, a blanket statute to take
care of cases not within any of the particular provisions." [I
agree one hundred per cent-provided that this kind of statute can
be drafted in such a way that legislatureswill enact it, which means
that they must understand it. There's only one way to find out
about this: try. Simes is in California,not far from Sacramento.
Let's go.]

6

Sparks considers the Vermont statute a "dangerous provision."
And what is the danger? That there might result "dispositions never
intended by the testator or grantor." 69 It is hard for me to take this
67

LEGIsLATORs' HANDBOOK 37.
os Id. at 37. Three years before the Legislators' Handbook, Simes had discussed
the same problem in his PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 74-79 (1955). At that
time he elaborated the statement in the Legislators' Handbook but added, "it is my
conclusion that no blanket cy pres provision should be included in perpetuities legislation." I can only infer, and certainly hope, that the omission of that sentence in
the Legislators" Handbook was intentional and significant.
69 Sparks, supra note 61, at 498.
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"danger" seriously when (a) the court is restricted to dispositions most
closely approximating the testator's intention, and (b) the alternative is
to strike down the gift entirely and give the property to somebody
completely outside the testator's scope of donative intent.
I cannot find that anyone else has indicated doubts about the cy
pres statutes, so it would seem that all we have to do now is get cracking
with the legislatures.
HOW CAN THE NONSPECIALIST LAWYER OR LEGISLATOR
REACH A CONCLUSION?

There is a danger in this welter of law review articles, published
lectures, ABA proceedings, and handbooks by perpetuities specialists.
It is that the nonspecialist will say, "How can I judge the merits of
this controversy? My field is corporations--or trial practice, or tax.
Each of these pros sound plausible-until you read what the other
fellow says-and they do get pretty excited, don't they? So, a plague
on both their houses; I'll think of something else."
There is an answer to this. In any case where you find a controversy between specialists, try to find a group of other specialists who
are clearly qualified, disassociated personally and professionally from
the controversy, and who have made a study of the issues and come up
with answers."0
The Law Reform Committee, appointed by the Lord Chancellor,
includes four justices of the High Court of Justice, three practicing
barristers (including the author of a standard text on real property),
two practicing solicitors, and three law professors from leading English
universities. In 1954 they were charged by the Lord Chancellor with
considering the Rule Against Perpetuities. After two years of study
they presented a thirty-five-page Report containing twenty-two recommendations for legislation which can be found in the Legislators'
Handbook.71 The recommended legislation includes adoption of waitand-see provisions and, despite rejection of broad-scale cy pres, accomplishes the same result by statutory provisions which in my judg70 This applies in other fields, e.g., the currently raging controversy as to the
adequacy of American military strength. The controversy involves the White House,
the Pentagon, Capitol Hill, and all candidates for the Presidency. No one directly
involved can be clearly absolved of bias of one kind or another. But when you get
groups like the Rockefeller Brothers Committee (privately organized and financed)
and the Gaither Committee (appointed by the President) coming up with answers
which all go in one direction, some confidence in their conclusion is justified.
71 pp. 8-9. But the Handbook does not include the 30 pages of extremely informative analysis of the defects of current law with which I am completely in accord
For my comment on the Report see Perpetuities Reform by Legislation: England,
70 HARv. L. Rav. 1411 (1957), reprinted as Appendix III to LEACH & TUDOR, op. cit.
supra note 66, at 217.
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ment are somewhat too complex for enactment in many American
states.72
It may be inferred that the anti-reformists don't like this Report
but don't quite know what to do about it. Sparks doesn't mention it
in the attacks on wait-and-see legislation contained in his annual
chapters for the Survey of American Law or in his 1959 article on "A
Decade of Transition in Future Interests." Mechem doesn't mention
it in his 1959 article in this Review. Bordwell's 1956 article surely
went to press before the Report (November, 1956) was available, but
he has been quiet as a mouse on the subject in the intervening three
years. Simes includes the Summary of Recommendations in the
Legislators' Handbook but does not attempt to answer the Report in
his Appendix IV opposing wait-and-see statutes. For those interested
the item can be had from Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, for
Is 6d.
APPEARANCES NOTWITHSTANDING, THIS

Is SElUOus BUSINESS

There has been a good deal of fun and games about the last few

years of running debate. I started this by hamming up a couple of
1952 articles-consciously, to get people to read them and thus attract
attention to the problem. (As Senator James Hamilton Lewis of Illinois
used to say about his pink beard, anything that attracts attention is
good; you would rather have it dignified, but you don't always have
a choice.) Then Bordwell and Mechem joyfully entered the act, turning the hose on me personally; I am flattered by this and enjoy it,
especially as it gives me a free hand in returning buffet for buffet among
a small fraternity of old friends.7"
But enough is enough. These issues have been debated ad nauseam.
There hasn't been a new idea in at least two years-including the
present Article which is mostly a rehash of already available material.
72 The reader may ask why there has been no Act of Parliament in view of this
unanimous Committee Report? A good question, to which the answer requires more
than usual understanding of Parliamentary procedures. First, a bill must be drafted;
and this is the prerogative of parliamentary officials and is not permitted to the committee. Second, either the bill must become a government measure (in competition
with the overwhelmingly important public issues of the day) or a private member's
bill (and private members get time only by ballot and must then choose priority for
this time). See Thornely, Property Law-The Rule Against Perpetuities-Reform,
1957 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 30, 34. Lest we become too sanguine it is worth remembering
that § 163 of the Law of Property Act (reducing to 21 excessive age contingencies)
was proposed by a Royal Commission in 1832 but not enacted until 1925. They don't
rush things in the Old Country.
73 On submitting this Article I sent copies to Professors Bordwell, Mechem,
Simes and Sparks, offering to delete any passages they found personally offensive and
suggesting that they make any desired reply in the same issue of this Review. Two
deletions were made; and Professor Mechem has accepted the invitation to make
a reply.

1960]

PERPETUITIES LEGISLATION

Simes warned against precipitate action and counselled careful study;
but that was six years ago, and the possibilities of fruitful study have
long since reached the point of diminishing returns. The English Law
Reform Committee, Simes' book, Waterbury's compendious article,
the Legislators' Handbook, and miscellaneous familiar items have exhausted this mine. The last thing we need is a committee study-that
perfect prescription for inaction 7 4-- except a very small committee in
a particular state with the definite objective of immediate statutory
reform, as recommended by Dean Niles for New York.
So let's stop playing blocks and cutting paper dolls and join
together in the practical business of making law. The law reviews have
done all they can in this type of situation: creating (or destroying) the
climate for reform, and identifying goals. But reform will be carried
out by individual state legislatures acting upon committee reports concerning bills which have been thoughtfully and professionally drafted
and which some legislator has been induced to put in the hopper and
sponsor. This takes leg work and lobbying in the best sense-that is,
using the instrumentalities of democracy selflessly in the public interest.
It is a state by state matter and must be handled locally.
I have already suggested that Mechem and Simes can and should
go to work at Harrisburg and Sacramento, respectively. (The California bar is still buzzing with indignation about the Haggerty case,
so the climate for reform there is presently propitious.) Sparks can do
the same in Albany, and Dean Niles is obviously eager to assist.
Waterbury was legislation-minded when he was at Montana, 75 and his
current home state of Minnesota could use his help. Bordwell's deep
learning and great prestige could bring order to New Jersey or Iowa
law. Schuyler has dipped his toe in the water by actually drafting a
statute (though my experience leads me to think it is too complex for
74 Sometimes a look at history is helpful. In quest of funds for his expedition,
Columbus arrived in the royal city of Cordova on January 20, 1486. He first was
granted audience by Ferdinand and Isabella in May of the same year, whiling away
the interval by acquiring a mistress and begetting a son. Ferdinand was unimpressed
but Isabella gave credence to Columbus' "new-fangled" ideas. In the early summer
of 1486 she appointed a committee to examine into the matter headed by Fray Hernando de Talavera. The committee reported favorably late in 1490. The report was
attacked on the ground that St. Augustine had said there was no land on the other
side of the globe from Europe. (I do not wish to alienate the Catholic vote by
analogizing St. Augustine to John Chipman Gray-both great men but both dead a
long time.) So what happened? The Queen appointed another committee headed
by Bartolome de Las Casas. Las Casas, who seems to have been a "man of action"
(any significance in that first name?), reported in a few months. Very shortly, after
some tight negotiations, the enterprise was approved, and financed-but not, sad to
relate, by the pledging of Isabella's jewels which is a fable concocted in the seventeenth
century. 1 MoRIsoN, ADMIRAL OF THE OCEAN SEA 116-37 (1942). Actually a delay
of only about five years is par on the course for two committees.
75 Waterbury, Montana Perpetuities Legislation-A Plea for Reform, 16 MONT.
L. REv. 17 (1955).
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most state legislatures) and could profitably plunge all the way in at
Springfield to the benefit of Illinois law.
I do not greatly care what type of statute is enacted. The Vermont
statute is in my view the best of the lot, but the MassachusettsConnecticut-Maine version is quite satisfactory. I sympathize with
Schuyler's wish to get rid of the vesting concept, but I doubt that it is
worth the effort. I consider it very important to put time limitations,
one way or another, on possibilities of reverter and rights of entry.
And, with a view to eliminating real clogs on alienability, I believe all
states could profitably enact a version of the Pennsylvania Price Act.
Any statute prepared by any of the experts mentioned in the previous
paragraph will be good, and this goes for several dozen more specialists
in the field throughout the country.
The talky-talk phase in this business should be considered at an
end. Now let's all do something about it. And let's needle the
British in Washington this summer into getting action in Parliament.

